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ABSTRACT  
This paper challenges the standard a priori/a posteriori distinction by looking at statements 
in which comprehension requires more that merely passive awareness of objects and their 
properties.  A proposal is made to add to (not to supplant) the traditional categories of 
knowledge, the “a positio,” characterized by active, intentional, and collective involvement 
of language users in the existence and nature of objects of reference needed for the truth of 
statements about various kinds of artifacts, broadly construed.  The conditions of 
understanding statements about institutions, institutional activity and standards of 
measurement are considered in some detail. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In their attempts to understand how knowledge is gained and organized, 
philosophers have routinely distinguished the a priori from the a posteriori.  
This distinction is, of course, fundamental to the divide between empiricists 
and rationalists, the former insisting that experience is our only source of 
knowledge and the latter allowing that, in addition to experience, some 
genuine knowledge is purely conceptual.  By ‘experience,’ empiricists usually 
have meant what can be learned directly from sensation via the five senses 
(and perhaps by memory and introspection).  Thus, ‘the sky is now blue’ is a 
posteriori since neither the sky nor its current color can be known except by 
sensory inspection.  In general, the subject matter of experiential learning par 
excellence is material nature since, as is often said, it is only the “external” 
realm that is capable of interacting with the senses causally.  So, empirical 
knowledge gounds out in material reference. 
By ‘conceptual’ rationalists have usually meant to draw attention to some 
sort of direct intellectual insight that is not mediated by or grounded in 
sensory experience.  Thus, ‘the sky is not blue and red all over’ is a priori.  
The subject matter most commonly thought to be clearly subject to purely 
intellectual or conceptual insights has been logic and mathematics.  Thus the 
Pythagorean Theorem can be said to be a priori due to its proof, of which 
there are numerous variations, depending only on formally definable, 
conceptually grounded geometric and/or algebraic relations.   The color 
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example just given falls under this general description although its subject 
matter is of a different type and some famous attempts have been made to 
demonstrate external existence and moral truths a priori.1 
Hence, the more or less standard chart of the a priori /a posteriori 
distinction (treating the analytic/synthetic as a parallel, historically 
important, criterion) runs something like this: 
                                   
1  Perhaps the most successful of these are due to Kant and can be found in the first 
Critique refutation of idealism and the Foundations argument for the categorical 
imperative. 
A brief historical sketch maybe pf some use here.  Plato, who was the first to 
systematically make something like the a priori/a posteriori distinction, drew the 
distinction along two dimensions: the kinds of objects one knows or refers to on the one 
hand and the kinds of evidence they provide together with the associated mental attitudes 
one takes towards those objects on the other.   It is clear enough that he also thought that 
knowledge a priori (conceptual knowledge of relations among forms) is stable, i.e., 
necessary rather than varying situationally like knowledge derived from sense perception. 
(See the divided line analysis in Republic, Bk. 6.)  Beginning with Leibniz (New Essays 
Concerning Human Understanding), efforts were directed to making the distinction more 
rigorous.  The question, which persisted through the middle of the last century, was 
whether a reliable, purely linguistic criterion could be devised to mark the distinction.  
Famously, Kant rejected this linguistic strategy (though he adopted it for the 
analytic/synthetic distinction).  His main contribution is his insistence that a priori 
knowledge is indispensable if we are to have any knowledge at all and that a priori 
propositions may be necessarily true in a way that a posteriori propositions cannot, though 
it is worth remarking that his conception of the a priori crosses Plato’s line between kinds 
of objects, since both mathematical truths and fundamental knowledge of nature as it 
show up in the categories of the understanding are a priori for Kant. Moreover, he argued 
that some of these necessary truths are informative in a way that is similar to non-
necessary empirical truths.  The synthetic a priori that forms the core of his system does 
not comprise the “miserable tautologies” of Leibniz or Hume.  (He makes his case in the 
first Critique, “Transcendental Analytic.”)  But Frege and his followers rejected the 
synthetic a priori, collapsing the a priori into the analytic, which they thought could be 
given a purely linguistic criterion, either in terms of meaning or provability.  (See Frege, 
Foundations, esp. sec. 12-17.)  Gödel demonstrated the inadequacy of the provability 
criterion (“On Formally Undecideable Sentences…” in van Heijenoort) and the linguistic 
reduction withered further under Quine’s skepticism over whether meaning could serve to 
distinguish the analytic from the synthetic.  Quine left the basic distinction between the a 
priori and the a posteriori unimpugned directly, though, by his lights, in the questionable 
company of the analytic/synthetic.  (See W. V. O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View.)  
This spark of innocence left hope that some non-trivial knowledge may yet turn out to be 
necessary, at least in a metaphysically internalist way, and Hilary Putnam and Saul 
Kripke have risen to this possibility, offering claims about chemical composition, origins of 
substances, and standards of measurement as examples.  (See Kripke, Naming and 
Necessity, and Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality.)  Recent work by Lawrence Bonjour 
(In Defense of Pure Reason), Albert Casullo, (A Priori Justification), Robert  Audi (The 
Architecture of Reason ) and others has once again affirmed the position that a priori 
knowledge depends on intellectual insight or self-evidence rather than experience. 
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 Analytic Synthetic 
a priori √ ? 
a posteriori ? √ 
 
        
One controversy is over what goes where and whether there are any 
synthetic a priori or analytic a posteriori propositions.  Everyone seems to 
want to allow a very broad range of empirical knowledge subsisting 
unperturbed alongside whatever a priori knowledge there is or might be.  But, 
whichever boxes one thinks have instances, the apriori/a posteriori distinction 
itself seems and is usually intended in some sense to be exhaustive.  What I 
show here is that this assumption must give way in the face of more careful 
attention to the features of a different set of examples.  The reason, which I 
hope to make clear, is that both a priori and a posteriori knowledge as so far 
conceived are essentially passive modes of cognitive uptake.   I believe this 
passivity prevents the traditional distinction from accounting for an 
important range of evidence and that the a priori and a posteriori do not 
exhaust the kinds of knowledge we can have because they do not exhaust the 
kinds of reference we can make to objects of knowledge.  There are many 
cases of genuine knowledge that rest on a kind of active semantic construction 
that is responsive to contextual pragmatics.2  Here I want to draw attention 
to belief and knowledge that is clearly and usually knowingly due to the 
activity of the knower and therefore does not fit into the simple, tidy scheme 
of the traditional a priori/a posteriori distinction.  For reasons that should 
become clear, I will call the kinds of belief and knowledge that completes (or 
extends) the traditional scheme, the ‘a positio.’ 
 
2.  Counterexamples 
A rich example will, I hope, help to suggest and clarify the kind of 
evidence that enables successful reference to a range of objects that I believe 
are left unaccountable by the traditional distinction.  Recently it was 
reported that NASA’s Opportunity Rover sent back pictures from the surface 
of Mars of so-called “blueberries,” which result from mineral (hematite) 
deposition from water, a phenomenon known to occur on the earth as well.  
To begin where there is least controversy, one aspect of the example clearly 
presents a fact that is knowable only empirically and contingently.  That is 
the fact that the blueberries were observed, if indirectly.  But now, if we 
                                   
2  I do not wish to beg any questions against Kant at this point.  There is, of course, a sense 
in which Kantian a priori knowledge is not passive.  But the activity that produces it is, as 
it were, unknowable to the knower or language user. 
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follow Kant and perhaps Kripke, it is by necessity that such blueberries form 
by mineral deposition from water.  Like oxygen and hydrogen bonding in the 
usual way to form water, it is, as it were, in the nature of such substance to do 
so.  Propositions about the fundamental chemical process resulting in 
blueberries would be, from a Kantian perspective, at least a candidate for the 
synthetic a priori while for Kripke they might serve as an examples of the 
analytic a posteriori.  For present purposes, however, this is a distinction that 
make no difference. 
Instead of pursuing that issue, let us attend to another aspect of the case 
that is not yet captured by the traditional distinction.  That is the fact that 
the rover was (and quite remarkably still is!) on a mission from NASA.  The 
reason, I suggest, that this feature is omitted from the resources of the 
standard analyses is that NASA is neither an object of empirical observation, 
nor is it an object of strictly intellectual intuition.  If this is correct, and I 
hope to show that it is, the assumption of the passivity of knowledge common 
to the a priori and the a posteriori necessarily obscures a proper account of this 
and similar examples.  However we divide or mingle these two epistemic 
dimensions, the references to NASA, to NASA’s rovers and to the beliefs and 
knowledge they produce will escape our semantic net.  We need a third 
dimension, one that is more sensitive to our own constructive contributions to 
the relevant form of receptivity, in which to situate such reference. 
There are countless such examples.  ‘I gave an exam in philosophy class 
yesterday.’  ‘If today is Tuesday, it’s not Thursday.’  ‘The Dow rose last 
year.’  Etc.  Paradigm examples of a posteriori knowledge are those resulting 
directly from sense experience: this apple is red.  Paradigms of a priori 
knowledge are purely conceptual: 5+7=12.  These are all examples of passive 
knowledge.  But I cannot know what a philosophy class is or what the Dow is 
or even what Tuesday is passively.  Our example of the expression of our 
knowledge of NASA’s probing of Mars is also quite different.  First, there is 
no natural or necessary entity one could be passive towards that answers to 
the name or description of NASA.  NASA is a human construct, an artifact.  
Moreover, it is a social artifact, i.e., one that is created by collaboration 
among the members of a group, and it is a social artifact of a kind that is 
especially alien to nature, an institution.  One cannot know of such things 
purely passively any more than one can know about exams, days of the week 
or the Dow.  The key point is that these are mind dependent objects.  They do 
not exist apart from our actively constructing them.  Like Peter Pan, they 
subsist via the Tinker Bell effect: they exist only so long as we believe they 
exist.  And, like the cosmos according to some ancient theologies (and, we 
might add, Berkeley’s idealism) they exist only so long as they are actively 
sustained in their existence by mind.  By contrast, the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction is really only suited to knowledge of mind independent objects.  It 
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is no accident that it historically shows up prominently in the philosophical 
literature just when there is a scientific and mathematical enlightenment 
under way, as in ancient Greece and in modern Europe.  Nor is it an accident 
that notions of social construction of meaning, the family of epistemic 
concepts to which the a positio belongs, flourish when the social sciences are 
on the ascendancy. 
The fundamental semantic principle underlying the a positio is well stated 
by Robert Audi.  He says, “…one cannot believe a proposition without 
having all of the concepts that figure essentially in it.  Whereof one cannot 
understand, thereof one cannot believe.”3  Moreover, as Plato says, our 
epistemic attitude towards objects has to be attuned to those objects to be 
epistemic at all, i.e., we need the appropriate kinds of evidence about them in 
order to make meaningful reference to them and to make meaningful 
assertions about them.  If social artifacts are ontologically different from 
natural and purely conceptual objects, we need to assume a different 
epistemic attitude towards them and recognize a different kind of evidence to 
support meaningful propositions about them than we do towards natural or 
conceptual objects.  The knower has to participate in the artifactuality of 
objects knowable only a positio, at least to the extent of understanding that 
these are social constructs dependent for their being on our constructive 
activity.  This means that his or her attitude is active not passive.  Objects 
knowable a positio are, like empirical objects, subject to change but, like 
conceptual objects, they are not empirical.  To understand socially 
constructed objects like institutions, games, artworks, etc., it is necessary for 
experience and concepts to meet half way.  These objects need support from 
both sides but are reducible to neither. 
Artworks are good examples.  The audience cannot be merely passive in 
understanding “Stardust” or “The Potato Eaters” or these don’t exist as art 
at all.  It’s not that we don’t empirically or even conceptually observe 
institutional activity.  Rather, it’s that we can’t understand it for what it is 
except by consulting our own interpretive concepts, ones that we ourselves 
recognize are not the products of observation but of invention and imposition.  
The U.S Democratic Party, aside, as Mark Twain says, from being 
disorganized, is not natural, not a part of nature, and not something the 
concept of which can be derived from observation of natural entities alone.  
And what goes for other institutions goes for language.  Unless both speaker 
and listener, writer and reader, collaborate, language dissolves into mere noise 
and scribbles.  Indeed, it is arguable that language is the fundamental 
institution, since it plays such a fundamental role in the constitution of all 
                                   
3  Robert Audi, op. cit., p. 27. 
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other institutions as well as the sustaining of institutional practices.  If that is 
right, the term ‘language’ is itself an example of the a positio. 
I introduce the term ‘a positio’ to qualify the kind of reference, 
proposition, knowledge, belief, etc., that involves such non-empirical and 
non-necessary entities that cannot be known or referred to passively.  What is 
characteristic of the a positio is that we ourselves collectively posit what it is 
about.  Therefore, we cannot look to experience or even to intellectual 
intuition of necessary natures to substantiate such knowledge.  A different 
kind of evidence is needed.  Nothing that I can observe about NASA without 
it being posited as an institution engaged in space research could substantiate 
the claim that it sent the Opportunity Rover to Mars to snap pictures.  By 
observation of the related activity as if it were a natural course of events, all I 
could learn would be that such and such a sequence of events took place.  This 
would leave out all of what is distinctive in NASA being a branch of the 
government with authority over various resources, personnel, etc.  And, 
without knowing that, I cannot know that NASA took pictures of the 
Martian landscape and without knowing that, I cannot believe or know that 
NASA’s Opportunity photographed Martian blueberries.  For not only would 
I have failed to have any accurate, descriptive knowledge of NASA, I would 
have failed even to know into what ontological or semantic category the 
object called ‘NASA’ falls.  I would not even know whether the proposition 
commits a category mistake.  Perhaps NASA is a force of nature or a 
supernatural intervention in human history or a monkey in a zoo with a video 
game.  Of course, there are many things I can straight forwardly observe or 
that involve conceptual truths about NASA and its mission to Mars.  But the 
point remains that no matter how many such sensory observations I make, 
they will not support believing or knowing that NASA—the institution—
carried out this mission, that it took snapshots of the blueberries on Mars. 
Simply asking where NASA is should signal an ambiguous response and 
alert us to the problem.  On one hand, it seems it is in Houston, Cape 
Canaveral, etc., physical locations with physical parts: roads, buildings, 
populations, etc.  On the other hand, those locations and all their physical 
parts and inhabitants could exist before or after NASA.  So NASA is not that 
physical stuff.  Therefore, it is to that extent not an empirical object and 
cannot be an object of reference a posteriori.  Nor, because is it to be 
associated with particular persons, for it survives them too.  This is 
characteristic of institutions.  For such reasons we should count NASA and, I 
think, institutions generally, as constructed abstract objects.  That is the basic 
reason why they are not subject to empirical observation and the meanings of 
propositions in which they figure are not merely a posteriori.  Their features, 
bureaucratic structures and the like, simply outrun the empirical evidence. 
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But, just as not all aspects of the example can be comprehended 
experientially, there are, to be sure, aspects of our NASA example that are 
knowable a priori.  Anyone who comprehends the meaning of ‘Mars’ will 
know that Mars is a planet, just as knowing the meaning of ‘horse’ entails 
knowing that a horse is an animal.  But comprehending the term in this way 
tells us nothing specific about the planet Mars, in particular it does not 
answer NASA’s motivating question whether liquid water flowed on its 
surface.  Nor will any rational insight suffice.  Indeed, NASA has to go to all 
the trouble, risk, and expense to send probes like the Opportunity Rover 
there to photograph the place precisely because no one can know a priori the 
answers to our questions about it’s geology and possible incubation of life.  
Similarly for NASA.  Anyone who comprehends the term ‘NASA’ or 
‘National Aeronautics and Space Administration’ will know a priori that it is 
an institution.  But, aside from the trivial descriptive information the title 
suggests, that will be about all.  NASA can only be known through its 
history, its mission (as understood by its creators and members), the 
historical efforts of those holding various offices to realize its mission, the 
reactions of the society in which it is embedded economic, political, cultural, 
etc., features and relations), its growth, influences and perhaps even its 
demise sometime in the future. 
Much of this can be known neither a priori nor a posteriori.  The basic 
reason is that NASA is an artifact, a transformation of an ordinary set of 
physical things according to mind dependent constructive principles and the 
constitutive, collaborative activity of individuals in many different kinds of 
relation to that artifact.  The constitutive truths grounding institutions are, 
like a priori principles, contextually self-evident.  But, like a posteriori 
information, they require experiential realization.  I have called such truths ‘a 
positio’ to respect the artifactuality of their referential constituents but also 
to emphasize that these are essentially mind dependent rather than 
exclusively mind independent entities that could be known passively. 
 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
It is worth pausing briefly to contrast in summary how one goes about 
confirming beliefs about these three different types of objects.   A priori 
beliefs seem to require some sort of purely intellectual insight.  Their objects 
or the relations among them seem to have to be in some sense self evident 
(intrinsically necessary), or they need to be logically derived from such 
insights by self evident or necessary steps.  A posteriori beliefs would seem to 
require the mediation of the senses (or introspection) and appropriate causal 
links to the resulting beliefs.  The objects of a positio beliefs are neither 
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strictly self-evident (why does the batter have to leave the box after three 
strikes?) nor are they caused entirely by external objects (what causes the 
belief that the batter must leave the box?).  Instead, the meaning of a positio 
beliefs depends on and their truth is only confirmed only by the character of 
what is posited.  It is not necessary that there be a speed limit on the freeway 
as there is in nature generally but, once the speed limit is set and 
implemented, its necessity, in the sense that all drivers are accountable for 
obeying it, is there for the world to see.  If the batter were to get more than 
three strikes there would be a serious question whether the game was any 
longer baseball. 
 There is a certain irony in the fact that epistemologists making the a 
priori/a posteriori distinction have generally not taken seriously the need for a 
semantic and epistemic category for linguistic facts or other institutional facts 
that depend on them.  But obviously language is institutional in character; it 
is a mind dependent artifact or system of artifacts.  This leads me to suggest 
that some of the claims made by those hamstrung by the standard distinction 
should be revised. 
For example, how does one know that the standard meter stick in Paris is 
one meter long?  I suggest that the question is not about the physical length 
of anything.  Nor is there anything antecedent to the use of the word to have 
any rational insight into.  Clearly, being the standard meter is a social fact, 
not an empirical fact.  There is no empirical property of being one meter long 
except by the grace of something being posited as the standard meter stick, 
any more than the earth, apart from the constructions of geographers, has an 
equator.  But it is not strictly a priori either since the standard meter has to 
be an empirical object (then kept safe from corruption, etc.).  Treated as a 
positio, the question is not what we observe with either the body’s eyes or the 
mind’s eye but what we have created or constructed and launched into the 
world on our terms. And that should be in principle a much easier question to 
answer: since we are the makers we should be in a position to known what we 
have made.  To understand an institutional fact like NASA photographed 
blueberries on Mars or the standard meter stick is one meter long, one has to 
understand the background institution precisely as an institution.  I would 
make similar remarks about the characters in a play.  I see Hamlet on stage 
but he is not to be identified with the actor who merely counts as Hamlet in 
the context and no degree of rational insight can predict what the playwright 
or the director will have Hamlet do.  Writing or directing a play is an 
insidious way of predicting the behavior of characters.  The a positio, on the 
other hand, easily encompasses all three types of cases in so far as they 
involve institutional artifacts. 
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It may be objected to my characterization of the a positio that it confuses 
epistemic and metaphysical concepts.4  If that were correct, then it could not 
be a clear question of semantics or even of pragmatics.  My claim is a 
relatively innocent one.  It is that certain beliefs about the properties of 
physical objects, like the belief that the meter stick is a meter long, seem to be 
constitutive of the facts they are about since these facts are socially 
determined rather than “natural.”  Presumably, in itself, nature does not 
count, not even to one.  So it does not count to one meter.  There is no such 
natural length.  The claim that the meter stick is a meter long is not about 
some chunk of metal at all.  It is really about a distance abstractly (perhaps 
arbitrarily) defined.5  It is typical of the central features of a positio 
propositions that, like the a priori, they are necessary but, like the a posterori, 
they are changeable.  And that is due to the nature of the object of a positio 
belief.  What else could control the kind of evidence we can have besides the nature 
of the object—especially in cases where the object is socially constructed?  Nature 
provides no standard meter—or any other standards or norms—so we invent 
them and, eo ipso, what counts as evidence about them that can enter into 
relevant meaning and belief.  This confusion is illustrated by the (failed) 
attempt of a late nineteenth century Indiana state politician to legislate the 
value of p. 
Epistemology and its sub-fields, including semantics, is about our relations 
to and uptake of information about objects.  Some we observe.  Some we 
anticipate or remember.  Some we enjoy or find repulsive.  Some we create.  
As objects of reference, any of these may be a source of meaning, belief and 
knowledge.  The question is what are the appropriate epistemic criteria or 
standards for understanding each of these kinds of object?  And what are the 
conditions that have to be met in order to express our understanding?  Can 
                                   
4  Heimir Geirsson, e.g., has suggested that, “It is not the nature of the object of knowledge 
that determines whether knowledge is a priori or a posteriori—instead it’s the nature of the 
(possible evidence)…This is a distinction that does not depend on the nature of the objects 
they are about.”  (Commentary on an early version of this paper at the 2006 meeting of the 
Central States Philosophical Association, for which I am grateful to Prof. Geirsson.)   
Presumably, mutatis mutandis, he wants to say the same of the a positio. 
5 It has been approximated several times with increasing accuracy and stability, first with 
a geophysical measurement (one ten millionth of the distance from the equator to the 
north pole, then a prototype representing that measurement first with an iron bar and 
later with a platinum/iridium bar, then a certain number of wavelengths of light produced 
by krypton burned in a (near) vacuum (1,650,763.73 wavelengths of the orange-red 
emission line in the electromagnetic spectrum of the krypton-86 atom), and finally to the 
distance light travels in a (near) vacuum in 1/299,792,458 of a second.  (Note that the 
meter originally depended on locating the equator and the pole, both of which are 
idealizations.)  For practical laboratory purposes the meter is now set equivalent to 
1,579,800.3 wavelengths of helium-neon laser light in a (near) vacuum. 
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they be reduced to just one or two?  Empiricists are epistemic monists in this 
respect: all that can be known requires gounding in sense experience.  
Rationalists are epistemic dualists since they would add that some knowledge 
requires no experience.  I have been suggesting that the a priori and the a 
posteriori are not sufficient since they preclude full knowledge of institutional 
and other social facts for which no sense experience can be fully adequate but 
which cannot be known without sense experience.  For that I think we need 
the a positio.  I have not tried to impugn the knowability of objects of a priori 
or a posteriori knowledge.  Nor have I tried to deny that the a priori and the a 
posteriori are legitimate categories of propositions or sources of meaning, 
linguistic or otherwise.  The original distinction was predicated on intuitions 
of two different kinds of objects (though Plato had in mind four!).  My aim 
here has been merely to take into epistemic and semantic account another 
type of object: social artifacts, especially institutions, and the undersatnding 
of the social facts that depend on them. 
One might respond that the a priori and the a posteriori combined are 
enough even for knowledge of institutions and other artifacts.  After all, in 
some sense, most artifacts are or are deeply tied to external physical objects 
subject to observation.  But to understand something external as an artifact 
and certainly as an artifact of a certain kind, like an institution, and to express 
that perception in meaningful discourse, one has to collaborate in the 
constitution of the object as a social fact in a way that is not necessary and 
indeed may be positively misleading in the case of non-artifacts.  I have 
elsewhere6 suggested that socially produced objects like these requiring 
collaboration among language users are dependent on what I call “social 
intentions.”  So let me suggest here that what is most characteristic of a 
positio knowledge is that its genuine object is the social intention rather than 
the physical objects with which it may be associated.  And social intentions 
are neither empirical nor knowable a priori. 
I end with a relatively liberal revised table of examples: 
        
 Analytic Synthetic 
A priori
  
what is blue is not 
red  
C = d 
A 
posteriori 
water is H2O  the sky is now red 
                                   
6  See my paper “Social Intentions.”  This essay gives a brief but general account of social 
intentions and their crucial role in social obligations and collective responsibilties.  My 
subsequent article, “Normativity,” develops and broadens the social grounding of the kind 
of intentions and obligations at stake. 
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A positio
  
3 strikes and 
you’re out 
NASA photographed Martian 
blueberries 
 
Perhaps even three is not enough epistemic categories to account for the basic 
sources of our beliefs and their linguistic meanings and others are needed as 
well.  We should guard against being excessively Pythagorean. 
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